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The purpose of this paper is to assess the costs and benefits of the creation of the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and other integration o ptions for the MERCOSUR 
with the other countries in the hemisphere. The GTAP, a multiregional, multisector CGE 
model is used to simulate the effects of several scenarios that are currently on debate.  
The existing preferences, granted by previous agreements under the framework of the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA), and the preferential treatment granted by the 
USA through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI) and the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) are taken into account. The analysis 
decomposes the effects of the FTAA in order to assess the importance of market opening 
and market access and identifies the net effect of trade creation and trade diversion. 
Additionally, the FTAA initiative is decomposed in possible subregional agreements 
among the countries involved (MERCOSUR  – Andean Community, MERCOSUR  – USA, 
etc.). The assessment includes the estimation of the welfare effects in case the agreement 
does not include the agricultural sector. All the results are presented for the MERCOSUR 




El objetivo de este artículo es estimar los costos y beneficios para el MERCOSUR de la 
creación del Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas (ALCA) y otras opciones de 
integración con los países del hemisferio. A los efectos de simular los efectos de distintos 
escenarios de integración se utilizó un modelo de equilibrio general computable 
multisectorial y multiregional, el GTAP. Se introdujeron las preferencias vigentes  en la 
ALADI , en el SGP, la iniciativa para el Caribe y las preferencias para los países andinos de 
Estados Unidos. El análisis descompone los efectos del ALCA en el efecto apertura, efecto 
acceso y creación y desvío de comercio. Asimismo, el ALCA es descompuesto en los 
distintos acuerdos subregionales: MERCOSUR-CAN, MERCOSUR-EEUU, etc.). Se 
estiman los efectos sobre el bienestar en el caso en que el acuerdo no incluya al sector 
agrícola. Los resultados son presentados para el MERCOSUR como bloque así como para 
cada uno de sus miembros.  
                                                 
* This paper is part of the project “The MERCOSUR and the creation of the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas”, supported by the Tinker Foundation in the framework of the MERCOSUR Research Network.  
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1. Introduction 
 
During the nineties, there was a powerful surge of new regionalism and its characteristics 
have been discussed by several authors (Ethier, 1998; Devlin and French-Davis, 1999; 
Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2001). Against this background, a number of regional 
agreements in the Americas emerged or were restructured, like the Southern Cone Common 
Market (Mercado Común del Sur  - MERCOSUR), the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) and the Central America Common Market (CACM). There were also several 
bilateral trade agreements between Latin American countries, like those signed by Chile 
with MERCOSUR, with Mexico and with the Andean countries, and the one between 
MERCOSUR and Bolivia.   
The movement towards regional trade agreements is still going on. At present, 
MERCOSUR is involved in a number of trade negotiations with different countries or 
groups of countries. The most important of these negotiations are those that have to do with 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), those leading towards a free trade agreement 
with the European Union (EU), and the multilateral negotiations in the framework of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). The FTAA is the most ambitious initiative in the 
Americas, and it comprises 34 countries in the hemisphere.  
In addition to this, MERCOSUR has to renegotiate its partial agreements with 
Mexico and the CAN in the framework of the Latin America Integration Association 
(LAIA), in order to avoid p erforations in its Common External Tariff (CET). In fact, the 
negotiations with the CAN have a more ambitious purpose, to reach a free trade agreement 
similar to those signed with Chile and Bolivia. If such an agreement were achieved, it 
would practically  complete a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA). However, if the 
FTAA negotiations are successful, the preferences obtained through sub regional 
agreements will eventually vanish.  
The purpose of this study is to assess the impact of the elimination of tariffs within 
the FTAA on the MERCOSUR countries, and to look at MERCOSUR’s other options for 
trade agreements within the Americas. A number of questions can be raised about these 
negotiations. What would be the impact of market opening in each country? What is the 
effect of improved market access, particularly to the USA? How do the results change if the 
FTAA excludes the agricultural sector?  Is trade creation more important than the expected 
trade diversion? Are all the MERCOSUR countries affected in the same way by the 
integration options the bloc is facing? The simulation exercises described in this chapter set 
out to tackle these and other related questions.  
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From a theoretical point of view, it is well known that the effects on welfare of a 
preferential trade agreement are ambiguous, both for the countries involved and for the rest 
of the world. Even if theory may help to predict the direction of the possible welfare 
effects, the final result is an empirical question. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models have become the main tools for the  ex ante analysis of the effects of preferential 
agreements.  This study uses the model developed by the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) for the quantitative analysis of the effects of the elimination of trade barriers 
within the FTAA on the MERCOSUR countries. The effects on each of the MERCOSUR 
countries are considered, as well as the overall impact on the regional bloc. 
In the next section a brief review of the theoretical approach to free trade areas is 
presented. Section 3 deals with the version of the GTAP model that was used, the 
aggregation criteria and the simulation strategy. In section 4 the issue of the existing 
preferential tariffs is set out, and the simulation results are presented in section 5.  Finally 
the main conclusions are drawn in section 6. 
 
2.  Trade creation and trade diversion in a Free Trade Area: the 
theoretical approach 
 
The FTAA is a complex agreement among 34 countries in the hemisphere, which are 
already linked up by a net of bilateral and/or sub regional preferential agreements. The 
FTAA would erode the effects of the intricate system of preferences currently in force, and 
would establish a free trade system that would give clearer signals for investment location 
and resource allocation in the long run. This, in turn, would enhance growth and facilitate 
economic stability in the region, especially for the small economies where uncertainty 
about the permanence of preferences does not provide sufficient incentive for long term 
investment.  
In this section, a review of the theory is presented in terms of the expected results 
from a static model with perfect competition. This approach might be considered too 
restrictive as the empirical evidence shows that the main effects of a free trade area are 
dynamic, or are associated with the exploitation of economies of scale or with increased 
competition in small markets where non-competitive structures prevail. However, even 
though several papers on the FTAA have dealt with these dynamic effects  (among them 
Monteagudo and Watanuki, 2001, CEI, 2002 and Diao and Somwaru, 2001), none of them 
has taken into account the more basic issue of the magnitude of the actual policy change 
(considering previous preferences) or the analysis of its different components.  
In a static model with perfect competition, the effects on welfare of a free trade area 
are trade creation, trade diversion, market access and terms of trade. In a world where there 
are preferential trade agreements in existence prior to the formation of a free trade area, the 
extension of preferential treatment to new partners creates different effects that should be 
examined. On the one hand, the costs of existing trade diversion might decrease and, at the 
same time, the access effect might also  decrease for those partners whose exports were 
already receiving the benefit of preferential treatment. When analyzing an agreement such 
as the FTAA, these effects can be isolated by adopting an appropriate simulation strategy. 
In this section, the rationale for the simulation design is discussed. 3 
 
Trade creation and trade diversion. These are the effects of a free trade area from 
the point of view of the importing country, when the terms of trade are not affected. A free 
trade agreement induces imports from a more efficient partner that substitute for domestic 
production, and this leads to an increase in welfare because resources are allocated more 
efficiently (trade creation). It is also possible that the increased imports from a partner 
substitute for imports from a more efficient non-partner (trade diversion). Therefore, the 
joint impact of both effects may be measured by a simulation that captures the effect of the 
unilateral opening of MERCOSUR to imports from the FTAA partners, without 
considering the r eciprocal opening of those partners. If the effects of this opening on the 
terms of trade are negligible, the net effect of trade creation and trade diversion for any 
particular partner can be approximated in this way.  
Terms of trade. The approach described above seems to be appropriate for analyzing 
the global effects of the opening of the MERCOSUR members  vis-à-vis the rest of the 
FTAA because, from a global perspective, they are small countries. However, the 
MERCOSUR is not a minor supplier in the case of some export sectors, and this approach 
does not seem to be appropriate for analyzing the effects of the largest partners in the 
FTAA. Using the GTAP model, the net effect on the terms of trade for each bilateral 
agreement can be isolated.  
Market access. When a country participates in a free trade area it opens its own 
domestic market while at the same time obtaining preferential access to the markets of the 
other partners. Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981) emphasize the importance of improved 
market access as a result of preferential agreements. Harrinson  et al (1997 and 2001) find 
that market access is the main motivation behind Chile’s involvement in trade negotiations, 
as the possibilities of increasing its efficiency by opening its own domestic market w ould 
be modest because its tariff is uniform and low. This effect can be measured for the 
MERCOSUR by simulating the opening of its FTAA partners without the compensation of 
its own domestic market opening. 
While the trade creation, trade diversion and terms of trade effects have been widely 
analyzed, the market access effect is frequently disregarded, so it is useful to go into further 
detail on this subject. Preferential access to the other partners’ markets can have strong 
positive welfare effects in the exporting country, but it can have a negative impact on the 
importing country. In turn, the net welfare effect on the FTA could be negative, so the 
analysis can be clarified by considering two extreme cases (figures 1 and 2). Let us assume 
the case of a f ree trade area with rules of origin that limit trade deflection. It is a small 
region, so world prices are exogenous (represented by a horizontal line in figure 1 (Pw).  
FTA reduced protection
3.  A large exporting partner (country LX) improves its 
access to the market of a small importing partner (country SM). In this case, the country LX 
can satisfy all the import demand from country SM at its own domestic price (c1-q1 see left 
hand side, figure 1). If domestic price does not change in country LX, the free trade area 
does not have any effect on its consumption or domestic production. Country LX will 
reduce sales to its own domestic market to the same extent that it will increase its exports to 
country SM. At the same time, country LX will start importing from the rest of the world 
the necessary quantity to fully satisfy the excess demand in its domestic market (O-co, right 
                                                 
3 Originally this concept was introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1995). In the study by Vaillant and Ons, 
which is included in this volume, a complementary approach on this topic is presented. 4 
 
hand side, figure 1). Imports and tariff revenue increase in country LX, and its welfare gain 
will be equal to the total amount of its imports multiplied by the tariff (striped rectangle, 
right hand side, figure 1). In country SM there will be a welfare gain from trade creation 
and a welfare decrease from trade diversion (dotted rectangle), as imports from country LX 
substitute for imports from third countries. 
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The welfare loss in the free trade area that is due to trade diversion is equal to the tariff in 
country LX m ultiplied by imports of SM before the creation of the free trade area (lower 
than the subsequent imports). Therefore, under these conditions, the net result of the free 
trade area is clearly positive. Country LX (the exporting country) gains from the trade 
diversion of country SM (the importing country), which means a redistribution of benefits 
within the area, and it also benefits from trade creation. The free trade area increases its 
imports from third countries, and its tariff revenue. The rest of the world increases its 
exports to the free trade area, so its welfare also increases. Consequently, there is a welfare 
gain for the free trade area members and for the rest of the world.  
FTA enhanced protection. The exporting country is small (country SX) and  the 
importing country is large (country LM), so production in the former is not sufficient to 
satisfy import demand from the latter, see figure 2, where O-q0 (right hand side) is smaller 
than c o-qo  (left hand side). Again, country SX increases its imports  from the rest of the 
world to satisfy its own domestic demand; its domestic price does not change and domestic 
demand is satisfied by imports, so tariff revenue increases (striped rectangle on the right 
hand side, figure 2). Furthermore, the producer’s price increases to equal the domestic price 
in country LM (Pw(1+td)), production rises and so do exports to country LM (q1-qo.). Prices 
do not change in country LM, the quantities imported are maintained and there is no trade 
creation, but there is trade diversion (dotted rectangle, right hand side, figure 2). In country 
SX, producer surplus increases but there is an inefficient allocation of resources. The net 
effect on welfare in the exporting country SX is positive (tariff revenue increases and so 
does producer surplus). However, the producer surplus increase plus the revenue increase in 
country SX (striped rectangle plus dotted area on the right hand side, figure 2) do not 
compensate for the welfare loss from trade diversion in country LM (dotted rectangle, left 
hand side). Therefore, the free trade area has a net negative effect due to the efficiency loss 
of a reallocation of resources to the production of goods that could be purchased at a lower 
cost in the rest of the world. There is a redistribution of b enefits within the area, and a 
negative effect on the rest of the world, which is discriminated against. 
In between these two extreme cases, there are numerous possibilities: a free trade 
area can reduce protection in the importing country when this is a small country that adopts 
its partner’s prices, or protection can increase in the exporting country when it is a small 
country.  
MERCOSUR can be thought of as a small country in the FTAA, it imports 
manufactured goods and it is more protected than the USA. In contrast, the USA is a large 
country importing agricultural products, and it has higher protection than the MERCOSUR 
for those types of goods. In the first case one can expect a welfare improvement for the area 
as a whole, an ambiguous effect on the MERCOSUR, and a clearly positive effect on the 
USA. In the case of the agricultural sector the second situation would hold, the 
MERCOSUR would improve its welfare while the USA would suffer a clear trade 
diversion effect that cannot be offset by the MERCOSUR welfare gains.  
If a free trade area is created on top of previous preferential trade agreements, the 
existing preferences will be eroded. In the country that was already importing from its 
partners, trade diversion can be reduced, but for the country that exported to the region, the 
gains associated to regional market access diminish. If it is a reduced protection free trade 
area, the exporting country loses in terms of market access. In this case, the importing 
country increases its welfare because trade diversion is reduced and there is trade creation, 8 
 
but the country that exported to the free trade area loses. If the free trade area is enhanced 
protection, trade diversion increases in the importing country and the welfare of the 
exporting country does not change.  
These issues can be discussed in the case of the effects of the FTAA on the 
MERCOSUR through an appropriate simulation strategy. By simulating a unilateral 
discriminatory opening of each MERCOSUR country  vis-à-vis all the other partners of the 
FTAA, the trade creation or trade diversion effects can be approximated. The effects on the 
other MERCOSUR partners would be the costs associated to the erosion of preferences 
plus the income effect derived from the greater efficiency. The effects on the other FTAA 
partners would measure the access gains. In turn, the market access effect can be evaluated 
by simulating the opening of the other FTAA partners without the compensation of the 
domestic market opening in the MERCOSUR countries. 
3. The model 
 
3.1 The GTAP model 
 
The study carried out in this paper requires a multi-country model, as the regional 
integration options for MERCOSUR bring about changes for its members, for each of the 
potential partners, and for third countries that are not involved in the agreement. For this 
reason, the model developed by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) at Purdue 
University was chosen for the empirical work. This model has the advantage of comprising 
a database and the appropriate software to facilitate the simulations. The database (version 
5) contains information on 66 regions or countries and 57 sectors or commodities for the 
year 1997, which is quite appropriate for this study. The base year is a good reference point 
to illustrate the situation prior to the beginning of the negotiations. In addition, the model 
has disaggregated data for three of the MERCOSUR partners (Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay), so the bloc can be analyzed not only from a global perspective but also from the 
point of view of countries with  very different interests. Furthermore, the country data 
allows the disaggregation of a large number of the countries involved in the FTAA 
negotiations.  
The model developed by the GTAP is very well known (Hertel, 1996). The standard 
version of this model ( used in this paper) is static and assumes perfectly competitive 
markets for goods and factors, but it admits differentiation by geographic origin in the 
goods market. There are five production factors in the model: capital, skilled labor, 
unskilled labor,  land and natural resources. The last two of these are specific for each 
sector. The institutions considered by the model are government, producers and a 
representative regional household.  
The representative regional household collects all the income generated by a 
representative agent in the region (factor payments and taxes) and distributes it through a 
nested utility function. At the first level, total income is allocated to private expenditure, 
per capita government expenditure and savings. At the second level, private consumption is 
allocated to different commodities assuming a Constant Difference Elasticity (CDE) utility 
function. It is a non homothetic utility function so it is more flexible for representing 
consumer behavior than more common functional forms such as the Cobb-Douglas or the 
CES functions. The government spends its income on consumer goods, assuming a Cobb-9 
 
Douglas utility function. Thus, each good or sector has constant shares in total government 
expenditure. Savings are exhausted in investment, and the model is investment-driven as 
investment is a constant budget share. As this is a static model, investment does not have 
any impact on production, but is a component in final demand.  
On the production side, a nested technology separable function with constant returns 
to scale is assumed. At the first level, a Leontieff function is adopted, which combines a 
fixed quantity of a composite of value added and intermediate inputs. At the second level, 
domestic and imported intermediate inputs a re combined using an Armington function 
(Armington, 1969). Finally, an Armington function combines imported goods from 
different regions in a composite imported good. Additionally, a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) technology function combines the five factors of production to obtain 
value added. Thus, the optimal mix of labor, capital, land and natural resources is 
independent of the prices of intermediate inputs. The elasticity of substitution between 
intermediate inputs and primary factors is z ero. All the elasticities used are the default 
values provided by the GTAP model. 
The GTAP database provides tariff data for 1997. It includes some non tariff 
barriers but it does not consider some preferential agreements in force at that time. In this 
study, tariffs were adjusted to take into account the preferences within MERCOSUR, 
among the LAIA countries, and those granted by the USA to the countries in the FTAA. 
These adjustments in the GTAP benchmark are described in section 4 of this paper. 
 
3.2 Aggregation Strategy 
 
Because this study focuses on MERCOSUR, three of its members were considered 
separately (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, but not Paraguay, because data were not 
available in the GTAP database). Five more countries/regions were considered i n order to 
evaluate the effects on other relevant FTAA partners. The European Union (EU) was also 
individualized and all other countries were gathered in a single group.  Thus, the GTAP 
data were aggregated into the following 10 countries/regions:  
1)  Argentina 
2)  Brazil 
3)  Uruguay 
4)  Chile 
5)  CAN (Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and the rest of the Andean Pact)  
6)  USA 
7)  Rest of NAFTA (Mexico and Canada) 
8)  Rest of FTAA 
9)  EU 
10) Rest of the World 
Consequently, in this study, the FTAA will be considered as an agreement involving 
four large r egions, MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay), the rest of South 
America (Chile and the CAN), NAFTA (Canada, Mexico and the US), and the Central 
American and Caribbean countries (Rest of FTAA).  
The FTAA countries account for 39% of the world’s GDP and 30% of its trade. The 
countries involved in the FTAA negotiations are remarkably asymmetrical as regards their 
relative size, the levels of development they have achieved, and their specialization 10 
 
patterns. MERCOSUR can be seen as a relatively small bloc n egotiating with countries or 
regions that hold a significant share of world trade and production. Together, NAFTA 
represents 33% of world production and 25% world trade, while MERCOSUR’s share is far 
less than 5%. The disparities between MERCOSUR and its potential partners are not only 
quantitative, significant differences can also be found in the trade specialization pattern of 
each region. 
In order to analyze the impact of the FTAA, ten sectors were considered. The 
classification of sectors adopted in this paper is based on that suggested by CEPAL (2001). 
However, some changes were introduced to take into account MERCOSUR’s main 
interests as regards market access and the level of protection for each sector in the US 
(which is the largest potential market f or MERCOSUR exports). Consequently, the 
following aggregation was finally adopted: 
1)  Agriculture 
2)  Mining  
3)  Beef and dairy products 
4)  Milling 
5)  Sugar 
6)  Other food, beverages and tobacco 
7)  Other traditional manufacturing 
8)  Manufactured goods based on natural resources and large economies of scale 
9)  Durable goods and manufactured goods that facilitate the diffusion of 
technical progress  
10) Services 
Table 1 shows the revealed comparative advantages for MERCOSUR as a whole 
and for each of its members, for the rest of South America, for NAFTA, for the rest of the 
FTAA, and for the FTAA as a whole. The MERCOSUR has strong comparative advantages 
in all agricultural sectors and food, while it has clear disadvantages in manufacturing and 
services. However, there are some differences for each member: Argentina has clear 
advantages in agricultural goods and milling, Brazil in milling and sugar, Uruguay in beef 
and dairy products and milling. On the other hand, NAFTA shows advantages in 
agricultural products, manufactured goods that diffuse technical progress, and services, 
while the rest of South America has advantages in agricultural products, mining and fuels, 
sugar, food, beverages and tobacco, and manufactured goods based on natural resources 
and with economies of scale. The FTAA in general has comparative advantages in 
agricultural products, milling, sugar and services.  
The differences or similarities in specialization patterns might suggest that 
negotiations could be easier when complementarity is found, because potential gains in 
welfare are greater when comparative advantages are strong. However, nations usually 
grant more protection to sectors that are not competitive by themselves, for social, political 
or strategic reasons. Therefore, to get an idea of the difficulties that the n egotiations will 
encounter, other aspects need to be considered. In particular, the present level of protection 
for each sector should be examined. 
A comparison of the average tariff prevailing in the MERCOSUR countries with 
those in the NAFTA countries shows a remarkable difference, both in the level of 




Revealed comparative advantages 










1  Agriculture  5,811 3,775 3,227 4,404  3,435 1,363 1,587  1,774 0,710 0,832
2  Mining  1,406 1,116 0,024 1,160  5,200 0,584 0,834  0,856 0,170 1,890
3  Beef & dairy  3,784 2,300 11,651 3,196  0,334 0,741 0,709  0,874 1,539 0,550
4  Milling  23,853 7,569 8,526 12,843  0,931 0,665 0,706  1,511 0,747 0,949
5  Sugar  1,335 15,336 0,120 10,156  2,531 0,144 1,002  1,610 0,740 0,899
6  Other food  2,504 1,301 2,294 1,732  3,209 0,781 0,962  1,013 1,258 0,742
7  Other trad. manufact.  0,598 0,895 1,729 0,837  0,508 0,585 0,635  0,648 0,886 1,315
8  Manuf. based on Nat. 
res. w/sc. ec.  0,710 1,162 0,567 0,990  1,345 0,874 0,899  0,905 1,191 0,870
9   Manuf. tec. diffusion  0,446 0,585 0,132 0,520  0,077 1,185 1,090  1,052 1,022 0,948
10  Services  0,613 0,713 1,597 0,721  0,785 1,157 1,144  1,116 1,024 0,909
  Total  1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000  1,000 1,000 1,000  1,000 1,000 1,000
*     Includes Chile and CAN 
**  FTAA except Mercosur 
 
Table 2 
Average MNF tariff  
 





1  Agriculture  8.5 8.7 9.8  12.0 11.4 13.2  5.0 12.8
2  Mining  0.1 4.7 0.2  11.2 5.0 0.4  0.2 1.0
3  Beef & dairy  17.3 19.0 22.5  10.9 18.5 14.6  50.1 22.0
4  Milling  12.6 12.5 13.2  11.1 18.6 4.6  8.0 20.3
5  Sugar  19.7 18.4 19.5  19.8 17.6 52.9  4.9 19.8
6  Other food  16.4 16.7 17.4  11.2 17.5 10.7  19.3 15.7
7  Other trad. manufact.  20.1 19.4 19.3  11.0 16.9 8.8  15.5 13.9
8  Manuf. based on Nat. res. 
w/sc. ec.  10.5 8.1 9.3  11.0 9.7 3.4  6.4 7.9
9   Manuf. tec. diffusion  15.4 18.5 12.7  10.9 16.7 1.9  5.5 12.412 
 
The average tariff in NAFTA is much lower than in MERCOSUR. However, some 
sectors in the NAFTA countries show higher average tariffs than any sector in 
MERCOSUR. An example is the beef and dairy products sector, which has an average 
tariff of 30.7% in NAFTA, but reaches 40% in Mexico and a lmost 70% in Canada. 
Similarly, in the NAFTA countries the average tariff for the sugar sector is twice the 
average tariff in the MERCOSUR. On the other hand, MERCOSUR has significantly 
higher protection for most manufacturing products than that imposed by the NAFTA 
countries. This is particularly true in the case of non-traditional manufactured goods 
(sectors 7, 8 and 9).  
The observed differences in the level of protection by sector point to the sensitivity 
of each sector when facing the possibility of future liberalization. Therefore, stiff resistance 
can be expected in the NAFTA countries against the trade liberalization of some of 
MERCOSUR’s main exports (beef, dairy products, sugar, other agricultural products).  
As can be seen, the MERCOSUR countries are specialized precisely in those sectors 
where the US imposes the highest average tariff. Therefore, it is easy to see that 
negotiations about sensitive sectors will not be easy. In fact, the US has clearly stated that 
the treatment for the agricultural  sector is a matter of multilateral negotiation, so it should 
be addressed within the framework of the WTO and not in regional negotiations. At the 
same time, Brazil is particularly interested in maintaining protection as high as possible in 
some manufacturing sectors. 
 




The wave of regional trade agreements (RTA) characteristic of the “new 
regionalism” has been particularly intense among the countries of the Western hemisphere 
(Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2001). The countries involved in the FTAA negotiations are 
linked by a complex array of RTAs, which should be considered when assessing the 
possible impact of the creation of the FTAA.  
The Latin American countries’ the willingness to follow an integration path was 
declared as long ago as 1960 with the creation of the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA), which was reformulated and renamed the Latin American 
Integration Association (LAIA) in 1980. However, trade liberalization made little progress 
until the 1990s, when the “third generation” agreements came into being (LAIA, 1997). 
This new type of agreement aimed at the liberalization of trade flows among the 
participants through the phasing out of tariffs and the establishment of very short lists of 
exceptions. Most members of LAIA became involved in the negotiation of bilateral 
agreements of this kind, which has given rise to a complicated network of reciprocal 
preferences.  
The integration wave moved further ahead for the Andean countries (Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), which revived the former Andean Pact and 
became the Andean Community (CAN), a free trade area that is intended to become a 
customs union. Similarly, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay created the 
MERCOSUR as an imperfect customs union, and they made significant progress in the 13 
 
deepening of the integration process, despite the macroeconomic instability prevailing in 
recent years.  
 
Table 3 
Main regional trade agreements in the Americas 





Customs unions     
   Central American Common Market (CACM)
1  1960  1961 
   Andean Community 
2  1969  1969 
   Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
3  1973  1973 
   Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR)
4   1991  1995 
Free trade agreements     
   Chile - Mexico 
5  1991  1992 
   Chile – Venezuela   1993  1993 
   North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
6  1992  1994 
   Chile – Colombia   1993  1994 
   Costa Rica – Mexico    1994  1995 
   Group of Three (G-3)
7   1994  1995 
   Bolivia – Mexico   1994  1995 
   Chile – Ecuador   1994  1995 
   Chile – MERCOSUR  1996  1996 
   Canada – Chile   1996  1997 
   Bolivia – MERCOSUR   1996  1997 
   Mexico – Nicaragua  1997  1998 
   Chile – Peru  1998  1998 
   CACM –Dominican Republic  1998  1999 
   CARICOM – Dominican Republic  1998  1999 
   CACM – Chile  2000  2001 
   Mexico – Northern Triangle 
8  2000  2001 
   Canada – Costa Rica   2001   
   CACM – Panama  2002   
1 Members: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. In 1990 it 
was reactivated and in 1993 the creation of a customs union was decided. 
        
2  Members: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.  In 1996, the original 
Andean Pact was revised and its name was changed to Andean Community.  
3  Members: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guyana, Jamaica, Sr. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Sr. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and Montserrat.  
4  Members: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. In 1995 the (imperfect) customs 
union came into force. 
5  Agreement was substantially revised and upgraded since 1999. 
6  Members: Canada, Mexico and the United States. 
7  Members: Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela.  
8   Northern Triangle includes El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. 
Sources: Devlin and Estevadeordal (2001), Salazar-Xirinachs (2002) and SICE. 14 
 
 
Other countries in the hemisphere were also actively involved in negotiating RTAs 
in the 1990s (Salazar-Xirinachs, 2002). Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua restructured the CACM, created in 1 961, in order to turn it into an effective 
customs union. The same thing happened to the CARICOM, created in 1973 among the 
English-speaking countries of the Caribbean. These customs unions have negotiated free 
trade agreements with other countries in the  hemisphere, and MERCOSUR has done the 
same. Some individual countries like Chile and Mexico have also been very active in 
pursuing bilateral free trade agreements within the region and outside it.  
Last but not least, the USA has also given proof of its willingness to pursue RTAs 
by creating the NAFTA with Canada and Mexico and, more recently, by reaching a free 
trade agreement with Chile (still in the process of completing all formalities). Furthermore, 
the USA has been one of the driving forces in the FTAA process. 
As a consequence of this proliferation of agreements in the Americas (see table 3), a 
full array of reciprocal tariff preferences is in force. In addition, the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP), which is applied by the USA and Canada on imports from the other 
countries of the hemisphere, also grants preferential access to those markets. Finally, the 
USA gives special treatment to some particular countries and some selected items, as in the 
cases of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and t he Andean Trade Preference Act 
(ATPA). To sum up, the tariffs applied on a considerable proportion of trade flows within 
the hemisphere are a long way from the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs, which are 
usually taken as benchmark in the assessment of trade liberalization.  
 
4.2 The treatment of tariff preferences 
 
The GTAP database used in this study includes the MFN tariffs enforced in each country in 
1997. Therefore, those tariffs do not take into account most of the existing preferences 
granted through bilateral or regional agreements among the FTAA countries. The case of 
NAFTA is an exception, since the GTAP database includes the tariff liberalization among 
its members, as well as the prevailing tariffs for the items still protected.  
If the existence  of preferential tariffs is not considered in the FTAA simulations, the 
effects of this hemispheric agreement will be overestimated since the GTAP tariffs are 
higher than the tariffs applied to a significant proportion of current trade flows. For this 
reason, a special effort has been made in this study to consider the main preferential 
regimes in force among the FTAA countries.  
First of all the GSP was considered, so a zero tariff was applied to 6.3% of USA 
imports from FTAA countries. Second, the preferences granted through the CBI and the 
APTA were included (only the  ad valorem portion). These regimes accounted for 8% of 
total USA imports from the FTAA countries. Third, all the reciprocal preferences granted 
under the LAIA framework were considered (including the liberalization of intra-bloc trade 
in the Mercosur and the CAN). On the other hand, the existing preferences within the 
CARICOM were not taken into account. The methodology used for the calculation of 
residual tariffs can be found in the Appendix.  
When these adjustments were made, the average tariff actually applied to trade with 
particular partners was much lower than the tariff available in the GTAP database (see table 15 
 
4). The difference is particularly large in the case of the MERCOSUR countries, which 









Average tariffs (GTAP and residual preferential tariffs) 
 
  IMPORTING COUNTRY OR REGION 
  Argentina  Brazil  Uruguay  Chile  Andean Com.  US  Rest of Nafta  Rest of FTAA 
PARTNER  PREF  GTAP  PREF  GTAP  PREF  GTAP  PREF  GTAP  PREF  GTAP  PREF  GTAP  PREF  GTAP  PREF  GTAP 
Argentina      5.88  21.79  2.07  11.95  5.29  10.92  8.09  12.83  3.24  4.96  6.09  9.90  9.76  9.73 
Brazil  0.00  15.47      2.01  12.10  4.61  10.82  9.86  12.46  3.94  5.22  5.42  7.43  10.92  10.91 
Uruguay  0.00  15.64  1.02  14.97      3.99  10.52  8.02  13.58  1.78  2.70  0.59  8.63  13.84  13.95 
Chile  3.50  13.57  0.35  7.15  4.08  13.87      3.34  13.03  3.00  3.60  4.47  13.00  11.36  11.41 
And. Com.  1.31  6.99  4.42  6.53  0.00  2.15  5.54  10.68  1.72  13.98  2.15  3.57  1.16  5.29  7.19  7.18 
US  9.84  9.83  10.43  10.43  6.21  6.20  9.37  9.37  9.98  9.98      1.16  1.16  12.28  12.23 
Rest of Nafta  10.05  13.23  8.13  9.55  1.31  7.45  5.05  10.22  13.34  13.38  0.41  0.41  2.60  2.60  8.40  8.40 
R. of FTAA  3.90  3.90  4.27  4.27  9.30  9.47  9.60  9.64  11.54  11.55  2.63  10.50  5.18  5.18  12.20  12.20 
Europ. Un.  12.00  11.98  10.69  10.69  9.52  9.52  8.57  8.56  7.98  7.97  2.16  2.16  4.98  4.98  9.19  9.19 
R. of World  10.34  10.32  9.37  9.37  9.12  9.11  9.05  9.05  10.72  10.71  3.26  3.26  5.56  5.56  10.81  10.81 
Mercosur  0.00  15.48  5.35  21.05  2.04  12.02  4.99  10.87  9.18  12.62  3.73  5.09  5.30  7.93  10.67  10.66 
Nafta  9.87  10.30  10.10  10.31  5.55  6.36  8.31  9.57  10.55  10.55  0.41  0.41  1.19  1.19  11.68  11.64 
 








 In the case of the CAN, the intra-bloc tariff decreases from 14% to 2%. Other 
agreements among the LAIA countries also have significant effects on the level of tariffs 
applied to reciprocal trade. This can be clearly seen in the case of Chile, which has signed 
agreements with most other LAIA members.  
Finally, it should be noted that, on average, tariffs applied by the USA do not 
change significantly, except in the case of the Rest of FTAA (mainly due to the CBI 
preferences). However, tariff reduction can be quite considerable for some particular 
sectors, since all the three regimes included (GSP, CBI and APTA) are applied to selected 
items, and these are mostly concentrated in a few sectors. 
 
Comparison of simulations with and without preferential tariffs 
 
The differences between GTAP and preferential tariffs suggest that the simulation of the 
impact of the FTAA might be greatly affected if the previous RTAs in the hemisphere were 
disregarded. In order to assess the significance of this question, two simulations were 
carried out. In the first, the FTAA liberalization was simulated starting from the GTAP 
tariffs, just as they are available in the GTAP database. In the second, the FTAA is 
simulated taking into account the above-mentioned preferential regimes, so the starting 
point is lower than in the first case. The results in terms of equivalent variations are 
presented in table 5. 
As was expected, the impact of the FTAA is overestimated when the GTAP tariffs 
are used in the benchmark. If the actual preferential tariffs are used, the gains are clearly 
lower for all the countries involved in the agreement except the USA and the rest of 
NAFTA. At the same time, the losses for the countries that do not participate in the 
agreement are also lower when preferential tariffs are used.  
 
Table 5 
FTAA simulations with GTAP tariffs or preferential tariffs 
Equivalent variations as % of consumption 
 




Argentina  0.89  0.28 
Brazil  1.00  0.25 
Uruguay  1.38  -0.04 
Chile  0.40  -0.12 
Andean Community  0.89  0.23 
US  0.08  0.10 
Rest of Nafta  0.19  0.20 
Rest of FTAA  3.92  1.10 
European Union  -0.09  -0.05 
Rest of the world  -0.08  -0.04 
MERCOSUR  0.97  0.26 




It should be noted that in the c ases of Uruguay and Chile the FTAA would even 
generate a welfare loss if the actual tariffs were considered. The reason for this is the 
importance of the existing preferences both countries enjoy in the market of their main 
trading partners. Clearly, Uruguay would be harmed by competition from other countries in 
the Brazilian market, so the market access effect in its favor (due to MERCOSUR) would 
be lower. Chile, in turn, has preferential access to most hemispheric markets, and this 
situation would be eroded by the FTAA. Similarly, the countries gathered in the Rest of 
FTAA would see their gains significantly reduced from the hemispheric agreement since 
their present preferential access to the USA market would be severely eroded.  
The opposite is true in the case of the USA, which increases its welfare. The reason 
for this is that this country improves its access to the other hemispheric markets while the 
conditions to access its own market do not change significantly because of unilateral 
preferences already granted to the other partners. The USA suffers smaller losses due to 
trade diversion in favor of its regional partners and at the same time obtains greater gains 
through improved market access to the other partners.  
Similar reasoning explains the results for the European Union and the rest of the 
world. The negative impact they receive from FTAA creation is lower than could be 
expected if there were no previous preferences. When the latter are considered, the negative 
trade diversion effect would be smaller, so their total loss is reduced.  
The comparison of these sets of results clearly indicates the need to take into 
account the existing preferential agreements in the hemisphere. Therefore, all the 
simulations presented in the following sections of this paper were carried out including the 
preferential tariffs in the benchmark.  
 
5. Simulation results 
 
If the ex ante assessment of the effects of a free trade area is a complicated task, it becomes 
even more complex when the whole array of previous agreements is taken into account. A 
general equilibrium model is a very useful tool for carrying out this analysis but its results 
cannot be easily interpreted. On the one hand, the effects of an agreement with several 
participants can be conceived of as the sum  of results of multiple bilateral agreements 
among them. Even though the final completion of the FTAA depends, to a large extent, on 
the possibility of reaching an agreement between Brazil and the USA, each bilateral 
agreement adds its own complexity. The result of each bilateral agreement is the sum of the 
direct effects on each partner of the opening of its own market and of improved access to 
the market of the other partners, plus indirect effects on third countries. On the other hand, 
from a theoretical  point of view, in a static model the result depends on the balance 
between trade creation, trade diversion, terms of trade and market access. Consequently, in 
this section the FTAA simulation is broken down into several components so as to facilitate 
the interpretation of results. 
    
FTAA: trade creation, trade diversion, terms of trade and market access. 
 
In order to analyze the possible effects of the FTAA on welfare, a 100% tariff reduction in 
every country of the hemisphere was simulated. In a way it c ould be said that this 19 
 
experiment does not capture the full impact of the FTAA, as it does not take into account 
the possible removal of non-tariff barriers. However, the tariff has been the main 
instrument under consideration in recent trade negotiations  as non-tariff barriers, although 
quite important as a protection device, are very difficult to measure and thus very hard to 
agree upon. Furthermore, the total liberalization of trade in the hemisphere is not very 
likely because in most agreements the protection of sensitive sectors is preserved, even 
between developed countries like Canada and the USA. 
The impact of the FTAA was simulated breaking it down in the following 
components: 
Opening of each of the three MERCOSUR partners vis-à-vis the rest of the FTAA 
countries.  The sum of these three simulations is equal to the effect of the simultaneous 
opening of the three MERCOSUR countries to the other FTAA partners. In the country that 
opens, the welfare effect captures the net effect of trade creation, trade diversion and terms 
of trade variation. Simultaneously, the welfare effect on the other partners captures the 
result of the erosion of preferential market access. Thus, when Argentina opens its domestic 
market to the new partners in the FTAA, the other MERCOSUR countries lose their 
preferences in the Argentine market. In theory, this effect can be conceived of as a 
reduction in the market access effect, as there are more partners that can benefit from trade 
diversion in that country.  
The results of these  simulations are presented in table 6. The net welfare effect of 
MERCOSUR opening up to other FTAA countries is negative. MERCOSUR would lose 
$418 million while the other FTAA partners would have positive welfare effects and the 
main winner would be the USA. Argentina would be the country with the largest losses 
because the opening of the Brazilian market would erode existing MERCOSUR 
preferences, and the net effect of trade creation and trade diversion from Argentina’s own 
opening would be positive but minimal. In the case of Brazil the net effect is also negative 
but less so, because even though it loses from increased competition in the Argentine 
market, this is partly offset by the net trade creation that occurs due to the opening up of its 
own market.  Finally, the net losses for Uruguay are considerable, like in the case of 
Argentina, because the market access loss is much higher than the positive trade creation 
gain. Therefore, in all three countries the estimated results show that the welfare reduction 
that occurs due to the deterioration of market access within MERCOSUR is only partially 
offset, in the case of Brazil, by the net trade creation stemming from greater competition in 
its own market.  
Access for each MERCOSUR country to the markets of the new FTAA partners. 
Again, the sum of these three simulations is the total market access effect for MERCOSUR. 
This access effect can be separated into two components: a) the improvement in market 
access for a given MERCOSUR country in the other FTAA countries, and b) the indirect 
effect on the other MERCOSUR partners. When a country obtains preferential market 
access, all the countries excluded are harmed. By adding up the effects of the three 
simulations, the net effect of the simultaneous improvement in market access for the 
MERCOSUR countries is obtained. In most cases, a positive effect can be expected, but it 
will be lower than when market access improvement is limited to each individual country, 
as the gains from market access are partly offset by the increased competition with the 
other partners. This actually happens in Brazil and Uruguay, but in Argentina the better 
access conditions of its MERCOSUR partners generate a positive effect.  20 
 
 
Creation of a free trade area among the other countries of the FTAA. In this case 
the welfare effect on the MERCOSUR countries is clearly negative. If the other FTAA 
countries liberalize their reciprocal trade, the MERCOSUR would be discriminated against. 
In the simulations carried out, the net welfare effect on MERCOSUR of a free trade area 
among the other FTAA countries would be negative but rather small (MERCOSUR would 
lose $900 million).  
 
Table 6 
Welfare effects on MERCOSUR, equivalent variations 
(Millions of US dollars) 
 
Scenario  Argentina  Brazil  Uruguay  MERCOSUR 
100% tariff reduction within FTAA 
1-  MERCOSUR opening to  
The rest of FTAA    -292      -104  -22 -418 
   Argentina     4      -278  -7 -282 
   Brazil     -284       191  -17 -110 
   Uruguay    -12        -17  2 -27 
2-  Market access of MERCOSUR to  
      the rest of FTAA     509      2.077  42 2.629 
   Argentina     479        -54  -7 418 
   Brazil      29       2.135  -1 2.163 
   Uruguay     1        -3  49 47 
3-  Free trade area in the rest of FTAA  
      (without MERCOSUR)     -240      -647  -22 -909 
Sub-total:       
FTAA without completion of MERCOSUR   -23      1.327  -2 1.302 
4- Completion of MERCOSUR     743        -57  -4 682 
Total FTAA (*)    720      1.269  -6 1.984 
Source: Estimates based on GTAP  
 
Completion of the MERCOSUR. Finally, as the liberalization within MERCOSUR 
had not been completed by 1997 (benchmark year), the FTAA simulation captures the 
effect of the phasing out of tariffs within MERCOSUR. Since that year, MERCOSUR has 
made considerable progress in the elimination of exceptions to f ree trade within the bloc, 
and it does not seem appropriate to impute the result of this process to the FTAA 
negotiations. Even though some defensive instruments (like antidumping measures) are still 
used, their effects are not considered in the tariff data for MERCOSUR. Table 6 shows that 
the net welfare effect of the FTAA on MERCOSUR is positive, and amounts to $1,302 
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The creation of the FTAA is one of the most important options on the menu of integration 
strategies that the Mercosur countries might pursue. However, there are other options that 
are under consideration in one way or other. The possibility of creating a South American 
Free Trade Area (SAFTA), or reaching a free trade agreement just with the CAN, or the 
alternative of negotiating an agreement only with the USA, have been frequent issues in 
public debate. Both in Argentina and Uruguay there have been influential opinions in favor 
of a bilateral agreement with the USA. Brazil, in turn, has shown a strong preference to 
negotiate a SAFTA before getting into the crucial negotiations of the FTAA. Therefore, it 
seemed interesting to evaluate these options and to compare the results with those of the 
FTAA alternative. Moreover, to simulate these other options is equivalent to breaking down 
the FTAA agreement into its main sub regional agreements, which is quite useful for 
understanding the results. 
 
The welfare effects of different options 
 
Table 7 shows the results obtained when the welfare effects of the FTAA are broken down 
by RTAs. The first thing to notice is that none of the agreements that involve exclusively 
South American countries have any effect on the world as a whole. Only the agreements 
where the USA is one of the participants have some global impact (of a negligible 
magnitude).   
At first glance, the FTAA seems to be the most suitable option for MERCOSUR, 
even though its impact is not very high. The columns in bold type show  that in the case of 
the FTAA the welfare gain for MERCOSUR is 0.26% of total consumption, while it is only 
0.18% in the case of the SAFTA and 0.19% for the sum of all the other possible RTAs that 
the bloc can reach in the hemisphere. More generally, MERCOSUR benefits from all the 
possible RTAs in which it might be involved, but the wider the agreement, the greater the 
gains. On the other hand, the NAFTA and other agreements that exclude the MERCOSUR 
countries have negative effects on the bloc.  
The other countries participating in SAFTA obtain mixed results in comparison with 
the effects of the FTAA. Chile would be better off with SAFTA, since its welfare loss 
would be smaller than in the FTAA. This is because the SAFTA would only erode the 
Chilean preferences in the South American markets, while the preferences Chile has in the 
NAFTA countries would remain untouched. The opposite is true in the FTAA where all the 
preferences obtained through bilateral agreements by Chile would be eroded.  
In the case of the  CAN, the welfare gains obtainable through the FTAA would be 
cut to one fifth in the case of SAFTA, although they remain positive. This can be explained 
by the preferential treatment principle in LAIA (see table 4). The CAN has greater 
preferential access t o the Mercosur countries and Chile than these countries have in the 
CAN markets. Therefore, the SAFTA agreement would considerably improve market 
access for Chile and the MERCOSUR countries, while the benefits from market access 
would be minimal for the CAN. In this case, it is likely that the erosion of existing 







Welfare gains as percentage of consumption 
 









































ARG  0.28  0.32  0.05  0.37  -0.04  0.00  0.04  0.00 -0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.03  0.00  -0.03  0.00  -0.09 
BRA  0.25  0.01  0.09  0.09  0.16  0.04  0.09  0.28 -0.02  -0.01  0.00  -0.04  0.00  -0.04  -0.01  -0.13 
URY  -0.04  -0.02  0.05  0.03  0.00  -0.02  0.10  0.08 -0.07  0.00  0.00  -0.03  0.00  -0.03  -0.01  -0.15 
CHL  -0.12  -0.03  -0.03  -0.06  -0.06  -0.01  -0.01  -0.08 -0.06  0.17  0.05  -0.10  0.00  -0.03  -0.01  0.02 
CAN  0.23  0.03  0.01  0.04  -0.02  0.00  -0.01  -0.03 -0.03  -0.01  0.00  0.20  0.12  -0.06  0.00  0.22 
USA  0.10  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.04 0.01  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.07 
RNAFTA  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.05  0.05  0.00  0.00 0.18  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.20 
RAM  1.10  -0.02  -0.02  -0.04  -0.08  0.00  -0.01  -0.08 -0.13  -0.01  0.02  -0.08  0.15  0.38  0.88  1.22 
EU  -0.05  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.02 0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.02 
ROW  -0.04  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.01 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.02 
MERCOSU
R 
0.26  0.11  0.07  0.18  0.09  0.03  0.07  0.19 -0.02  -0.01  0.00  -0.04  0.00  -0.04  -0.01  -0.11 
Total  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01 0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02 
 
* MERCOSUR, Andean Community, Chile-MERCOSUR, Chile-Andean Community 







As might be expected, the SAFTA yields negative results for the USA and for the 
Rest of America, as they do not participate in the agreement, but their welfare loss is 
negligible. The impact is null for the other countries in NAFTA.  
The other options for MERCOSUR should also be considered. An agreement with 
the USA yields positive results for the bloc, but the welfare gain is one half of what could 
be obtained through SAFTA. However, the benefits for each individual country are 
completely different. Brazil is the country that would have the greatest gains from an 
agreement with the USA, and these gains would be significantly greater than those obtained 
through SAFTA. The opposite is true for Argentina, which would suffer a negative impact 
from an agreement with the USA. Uruguay would be mostly unaffected.  
Finally, it should be noted that an agreement with the other countries in NAFTA 
would be less suitable for MERCOSUR than an agreement with the CACM and the 
CARICOM (gathered in the Rest of America). The welfare gains for the bloc are about 
twice as high, and they are much higher in the case of Uruguay.  
 
The effects of previous sub regional agreements 
 
The analysis above does not take into account the fact that, as was shown in section III, 
there are several free trade agreements already in force among the countries involved in the 
FTAA. In fact, the welfare gains from  FTAA and from SAFTA include the effects of 
several agreements that have almost completely liberalized trade among certain countries. 
In particular, they include the effects of full trade liberalization within MERCOSUR and 
within the CAN, which is at present virtually complete. They also include the effects of the 
completion of all the bilateral agreements signed by Chile (with the Andean countries, with 
MERCOSUR and with the NAFTA countries) which, in most cases, will come fully into 
force before the FTAA takes shape. Therefore, the impact of all these previous sub regional 
agreements should be deducted from the welfare gains of the FTAA in order to evaluate the 
real additional effect of the hemispheric agreement. 
In Table 7 the effects of FTAA and of SAFTA  have been further broken down in 
order to assess what is the real impact of the liberalization that has not yet been negotiated.      
The first thing to notice is that the completion of SAFTA is generally equivalent to 
the negotiation of a free trade agreement between MERCOSUR and the CAN. Chile, the 
only South American country that does not belong to either bloc, has signed bilateral 
agreements with each of the Andean countries and with MERCOSUR (see section 3 ), so 
the only liberalization agreement that remains to be made is that between the two blocs.  
Table 7 shows that the welfare effects of the existing trade agreements on MERCOSUR are 
greater than those stemming from the agreement between MERCOSUR and the CAN. This 
is mainly because of the large gains that Argentina obtains through the completion of 
previous agreements. Instead, Brazil and Uruguay would receive larger gains from an 
agreement with the CAN. These different results are explained by the composition of each 
country's trade with the CAN and their degree of complementarity. 
The CAN would not benefit so much from an agreement with MERCOSUR. The 
welfare gains would be one third of those derived from the completion of the full 
enforcement of previous agreements. Apparently, the completion of the  free trade area 
within the CAN and the bilateral agreements with Chile would improve welfare in the 
Andean countries more than a free trade agreement with the MERCOSUR.  24 
 
According to these results it is doubtful whether the CAN will be interested in the 
SAFTA option. Besides the low welfare gain that they would obtain from the remaining 
negotiations, it is clearly a second-best option compared to an agreement with the USA, 
which would generate much greater welfare gains. 
It is interesting to note that the w elfare effects on Chile are always negative, except 
in the case of an agreement with the NAFTA countries. Such an agreement is virtually 
sealed, as Chile has signed bilateral agreements with Canada and Mexico, and it has 
recently finished its negotiations  with the USA. Therefore, Chile’s negotiating strategy 
seems to be consistent with the welfare impact expected. As long as this country has 
bilateral agreements with most other countries in the hemisphere, it would be harmed by 
any new agreement involving t he other countries. Chile would lose the preferences 
previously obtained, and that is why the FTAA would reduce its welfare, as would any 
other agreement.  
These results to a certain extent contradict the position that each of the 
MERCOSUR countries has frequently maintained. In fact, Brazil has been the most 
enthusiastic advocate of the SAFTA while it has been quite reluctant to negotiate with the 
USA. In contrast, Argentina and Uruguay have paid little attention to the SAFTA option 
and have frequently expressed their willingness to reach an agreement with the USA. The 
numbers suggest that these positions have been mainly determined by political motives 
rather than reasons based on economic grounds. However, the present analysis is merely 
static, and significant dynamic effects cannot be discarded, therefore, a deeper analysis of 
that issue would be needed for a full understanding of the impact and a more 
comprehensive comparison of the options available. 
  
The option of a FTAA that excludes the agricultural sector 
 
The protection granted to the agricultural sector is one of the most difficult issues in trade 
negotiations. It is an unresolved subject in the WTO negotiations, and it threatens to be the 
Achilles’ heel of the FTAA. The MERCOSUR countries have strongly supported the 
elimination of all protective measures in the agricultural sector, as the developed countries’ 
policies hinder the growth of their exports. This issue has led MERCOSUR into 
confrontation with the USA, which refuses to deal with it in t he FTAA negotiations and 
prefers to discuss it at the WTO. Given the extreme difficulty to reach agreement on this 
subject, it seemed reasonable to simulate the FTAA on the assumption that the agricultural 
sector might be excluded from liberalization. 
Table 8 compares the welfare effects of the full agreement with the results that 
would be obtained if the agricultural sector were excluded. Three options are compared 
with and without the liberalization of the agricultural sector: the FTAA, the MERCOSUR-







Welfare gains as percentage of consumption 
 










 All goods  Manuf. 
goods 
All goods  Manuf. 
Goods 
All goods  Manuf. 
goods 
Manuf. goods 
ARG  0.28  0.25  0.05  0.02  -0.04  -0.06  0.02  -0.08  0.00 
BRA  0.25  0.18  0.09  0.09  0.16  0.09  -0.04  0.13  0.00 
URY  -0.04  -0.02  0.05  0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.03  -0.05  0.08 
CHL  -0.12  -0.23  -0.03  -0.02  -0.06  -0.04  -0.02  -0.02  0.00 
CAN  0.23  0.08  0.01  0.02  -0.02  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00 
USA  0.10  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.03  0.00 
RNAFTA  0.20  0.03  0.00  0.00  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01  -0.03  0.00 
RAM  1.10  0.65  -0.02  -0.01  -0.08  -0.03  0.00  -0.02  0.00 
EU  -0.05  -0.04  0.00  0.00  -0.02  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00 
ROW  -0.04  -0.04  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00 
MERCOSUR  0.26  0.20  0.07  0.06  0.09  0.04  -0.02  0.06  0.00 
Total  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00 










As was said before, if a full agreement is assumed, the three options are positive for 
MERCOSUR. The same sign is found when the agricultural sector is excluded, but the 
gains are much less, particularly in the case of a MERCOSUR-USA agreement, when gains 
are cut by more than one half. 
Both Argentina and Brazil reduce their gains (or increase their losses) no matter 
which negotiation option is considered. In the FTAA simulation, their welfare gain (as a 
percentage of total consumption) goes down from 0.28% to 0.25% of consumption in the 
case of Argentina, and from 0.25% to 0.18% in the case of Brazil. The latter is not harmed 
by the exclusion of the agricultural sector when the MERCOSUR-CAN option is 
considered. This is because the agricultural production mix in Brazil and the CAN are 
similar, and so there is only a small amount of trade in agricultural products between them.  
Surprisingly, in the case of Uruguay, when the agricultural sector is excluded from 
the FTAA negotiations the welfare loss gets smaller, so Uruguay would be better off if the 
agricultural sector was excluded. This astonishing result is due to the erosion of its 
preferences in the Brazilian market, which is one of the main destinations of Uruguayan 
exports of beef, rice and other agricultural products. The improvement in market access to 
other countries is not enough to compensate for the loss of preferences in Brazil.      
The last columns in table 8 show how each MERCOSUR country is affected by a 
potential bilateral agreement between each of the other partners and the USA. Argentina 
gains 0.02% of consumption by reaching  a bilateral agreement with the USA, but loses 
0.08% if Brazil does so.  Similarly, by signing an agreement with the USA, Uruguay would 
gain just as much as it would lose when the other MERCOSUR countries do so. Only 
Brazil gains more with its own agreement than what it would lose with the other partners’ 
agreements. These separated effects explain the results obtained in a MERCOSUR-USA 




From the results of the simulations presented in this study, the following conclusions  about 
the effects of the elimination of tariffs within the FTAA can be drawn: 
The welfare effects of the FTAA are rather small. This is partly due to the fact that, 
as a fraction of GNP, most countries do not trade very much.  
Whatever the integration option simulated may be, all the results are significantly 
different if previous preferential agreements are taken into account. If they are not 
considered, the effects of the FTAA are clearly overestimated, except in the case of the 
NAFTA countries. This is p articularly important in designing compensatory policies within 
the FTAA because if previous preferences were considered, the welfare gains would be 
greater for the NAFTA countries and smaller for the rest. 
As of 1997, there were a number of agreements in  force which included a phasing 
out of tariffs not completed at that time. Even though the tariffs used were adjusted to 
capture the existing preferences at that time, none of the liberalization commitments that 
stem from previous agreements among the FTAA  countries were considered at the 
benchmark. Therefore, despite the inclusion of preferences in existence in 1997, the results 
of the simulations are still overestimates, as the completion of those agreements cannot be 
attributed to the FTAA negotiations.  27 
 
Conversely, the static effects of the FTAA could be higher if the existence of non-
tariff barriers were taken into account. In fact, this type of obstacle to free trade can be 
quite important, but it is very difficult to measure, and requires a more detailed study.  
Leaving aside the liberalization previously negotiated, the most important 
negotiations for MERCOSUR in the FTAA are those with the USA and with the CAN. 
The net effect of trade creation and trade diversion for the importing country can be 
positive or negative, but is generally low. The market access effect is positive and much 
more important. The erosion of Argentine and Uruguayan preferences in the Brazilian 
market has a clearly negative effect, as their privileged access to that country is very 
valuable. In some alternatives, this negative effect is partly or fully offset by the increase in 
demand due to an income effect, as Brazil raises its expenditure and demand from all 
origins. In all the simulations, when the net effect of trade creation  and trade diversion is 
isolated, it is almost nil for Argentina and Uruguay and very small for Brazil. 
If the FTAA is created without the participation of MERCOSUR, the welfare effect 
of this bloc is clearly negative but rather low. Furthermore, agreements among other FTAA 
countries (excluding MERCOSUR) lower the potential gains of the hemispheric agreement 
for this bloc.  
The results obtained from the simulations carried out in this study contradict the 
stance that each MERCOSUR country has taken in the FTAA negotiations. Argentina and 
Uruguay would have greater welfare gains through an agreement with the CAN than 
through one with the USA, but in spite of this they frequently express willingness to reach 
an agreement with the USA. Even though these countries can improve their welfare by 
reaching an agreement with the USA, their gain is partly or fully offset when the other 
partners also reach such an agreement. Therefore, the positive effects of an individual 
strategy of this kind are quite unstable as they  depend on the other partners failing to make 
progress in a similar strategy. The opposite is true for Brazil, which has repeatedly insisted 
on the suitability of creating a free trade area in South America, and is less enthusiastic 
about the FTAA.  
The exclusion of the agricultural sector from FTAA negotiations reduces the gains 
of the hemispheric agreement. This is also true for Argentina and Brazil when considered 
separately. However, the exclusion of the agricultural sector does not worsen Uruguay’s 
situation because in that case there would be no erosion of its preferences in the Brazilian 
market, which absorbs a large share of Uruguayan agricultural exports.  
Despite the limitations of the methodological approach, the findings summarized in 
this section give a number of clues as to which issues are more important at the time of 
conducting the negotiations. In particular, the need to take existing preferences into account 
should be emphasized, and this suggests the need to obtain more complete and reliable data 
on that subject. 
The assessment of the impact of the FTAA on the MERCOSUR countries needs to 
be tackled from different perspectives. The approach that has been adopted in this study is 
suitable for identifying the static effects of such an agreement, but does not allow any 
inferences to be drawn about the dynamic effects or those derived from the exploitation of 
economies of scale. The empirical evidence shows that both of these could be very hight. 
By the same token, the effects of increased competition in small markets where 
noncompetitive structures prevail are not considered, and they can be quite important. 28 
 
All these effects, which are not analyzed in this study, could offset some of the 
negative impact found through the static approach. Consequently, the FTAA should be 
analyzed further, with other tools and from other perspectives, in order to have a full 
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Tariff preferences granted by the USA to other FTAA countries 
 
In the case of tariffs actually applied by the USA to imports from other FTAA 
countries, three special regimes are relevant: the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), and the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). In 
fact, imports from  FTAA countries that enter the USA with these preferential tariffs 
accounted for more than 10% of total USA imports from those countries. This figure might 
not be considered very high but it is significant for a number of sectors in which 
preferences are concentrated.  
Tariff data for the year 1997 was obtained from the USA International Trade 
Commission (USITC). The USITC Tariff Database provides information about the  ad 
valorem and the specific MFN tariff rates for all items at the 8 -digit level of the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), and also information about preferential regimes. In 
particular, it indicates the items eligible for the GSP, for the CBI preferences and for the 
ATPA, as well as the countries excluded from those preferences in some particular items. 
For the CBI and the ATPA, the database also gives information about both ad valorem and 
specific tariff rates. In order to obtain the average tariff for each of the sectors considered in 
this study, the estimated ad valorem equivalents to full MFN rates were used. For the CBI 
and the ATPA, only  ad valorem tariffs were considered, and a zero tariff was assigned to 
the GSP.  
The same aggregation method used in the GTAP database was followed to obtain 
the average tariff by sector and country of origin. Starting from the tariffs at the 8 -digit 
level, simple averages were taken to obtain tariff rates at the 6-digit HTS level. Then, USA 
average imports for the period 1998-2000 (from the ITC dataweb) by partner and tariff 
treatment were obtained at the 6 -digit HTS level. Finally, these import flows were used as 
weights to obtain the average tariff by sector.  
 
Tariff preferences granted through bilateral or regional agreements in LAIA 
 
In the case of reciprocal preferences granted by LAIA members, all the agreements in this 
framework were considered. The most important of these agreements is the MERCOSUR, 
which established a free trade area (except in the sugar and automotive sectors) between 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The CAN agreement is also very important, as it 
created a free trade area between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
Additionally, all bilateral agreements between any LAIA members were also considered: 
Bolivia and Chile with MERCOSUR, Chile with all other LAIA members, Mexico with 
most of them, some of the MERCOSUR countries with some countries belonging to the 
CAN, etc. 
The residual tariffs applied by each LAIA country to imports coming from all the 
other members, averaged at the 6 -digit HTS level for 1997, were obtained from LAIA. 32 
 
Trade flows at that same level were obtained from Hemispheric Trade and Tariff Data Base 
for Market Access. It was assumed that the residual tariff on any particular item was 
applied to all imports of that item. Then, for each country or group of countries considered 
in this study, average tariffs by sector and country of origin were obtained, using import 
flows as weights. 
  